5. Department of Homeland Security · Notable
Limit CISA's election role to pre-election cyber hygiene assessments
Printed page 155 5. Department of Homeland Security
“For election security, CISA should help states and localities assess whether they have good cyber hygiene in their hardware and software in preparation for an election—but nothing more. … CISA should not be significantly involved closer to an election. Nor should it participate in messaging or propaganda.”
What has happened
- Partially done
CISA's own budget says what it intends, twice, and Congress has not done it. The FY2026 justification's Program Change 5 and the FY2027 justification's Program Change 9 are the same proposal: "a decrease of 14 Positions, 14 FTE, and $39.6M from the Election Security Program within the CSD Cyber Operations, IOD Security Advisors, and Risk Management Operations (RMO) Infrastructure Analysis PPAs. As a result, the Election Security Advisors (ESAs) in each of the ten CISA Regions ... will be eliminated and cooperative agreement funding for the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC) will not be renewed." The FY2027 justification adds: "The program adjustment will conclude dedicated election security activities within the affected PPAs, including the ESA roles and EI-ISAC support. CISA will continue to focus on its core mission areas." Two readings follow, and both hold the rung. First, this is a Budget request, which §3b levels as `attempted` on its own; the item is already higher on the strength of the actual 2025 stand-down. Second, the FY2027 request carries the identical $39,610 thousand and 14 FTE in its *current services* column against a "FY2026 Annualized CR" — so the FY2026 elimination was **not enacted**, the program is still on the books, and Congress's non-action is recorded here in the note rather than as a second event. And the proposal is not this ask: the Quote asks that the role be *limited to* pre-election cyber hygiene assessments, while the budget would conclude dedicated election security activity altogether. Neither eliminating the role nor letting it lapse is the instrument the Quote asks for, which is a limit.
- CISA FY2027 Congressional Budget Justification, Program Change 9 — Election Security: eliminate 14 positions and $39.6M, end the ten regional Election Security Advisors and EI-ISAC funding, against an FY2026 Annualized CR base that still carries them
- CISA FY2026 Congressional Budget Justification, Program Change 5 — Election Security: the same 14 positions and $39.6M proposed for elimination a year earlier
- Partially done
CISA's election role has been cut back to roughly what the Quote describes, by attrition rather than by a published policy. The ten regional election security advisers and the mis/disinformation staff were placed on administrative leave in February 2025; election security work was paused pending a review of all election-related funding, products, activities and personnel; federal funding for the Multi-State and Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Centers ended; and the fiscal 2027 budget request would eliminate the Stakeholder Engagement Division's council-management and engagement offices. What survives on CISA's Election Security page is the voluntary, cyber-hygiene half the Quote would keep - the Election Cybersecurity Toolkit and no-cost security services for state and local officials. `partial` and not `done` because CISA still asserts election infrastructure as critical infrastructure and still lists physical-security work, and because nothing published limits the role by rule or directive.
Research log
What was searched, and what didn’t count as evidence
Research notes
The Quote sets a ceiling rather than a floor: pre-election cyber hygiene assessments, “but nothing more”, no significant involvement close to an election, no messaging or propaganda.
Measured against that ceiling, the messaging half is gone (#392) and the assessment half survives. The gap is that a Status measures action, and the action here is staffing and funding decisions rather than an instrument limiting the role - a future administration could restore it without repealing anything.
No Primary record was found for the pause or the review; two independent allowlisted outlets carry them, which is what a Status resting on Secondary evidence alone requires, and CISA’s own page is cited for what remains.
Reviewed 2026-09-06, together with #392. Both budget justifications were read in full, from DHS’s budget page (dhs.gov/dhs-budget; the older dhs.gov/publication/dhs-budget stops at FY2014), the per-year congressional budget justification page and CISA’s PDF. The finding is the second event above, and it cuts against a rung move rather than for one: the earlier note’s “the fiscal 2027 budget request would eliminate the Stakeholder Engagement Division’s council-management and engagement offices” understated what the budget does — it proposes to conclude dedicated election security work outright — and overstated what has happened, since the FY2027 current-services column shows the program still funded under an annualized continuing resolution.
- Action
- restrict
- Object
- CISA election security role
- ID
- 394