Rapidly expand space control capability including cis-lunar space

Partially done

Printed page 118 4. Department of Defense

“Rapidly expand space control capability, to include cis-lunar space (the region beginning at geosynchronous altitude and encompassing the moon), to provide early warning of an enemy attack.”

What has happened

Dec 18, 2025 Partially done
Executive Order 14369 sec. 2(b)(ii) makes it policy to ensure the ability "to detect, characterize, and counter threats to United States space interests from very low-Earth orbit and through cislunar space, including any placement of nuclear weapons in space", and sec. 3(d)(i) gives the National Security Adviser 180 days to implement a space security strategy that "addresses current and projected threats to United States space interests from very low-Earth orbit through cislunar space". Cislunar space is named in the operative text - the Mandate's own framing - but the strategy was a deliverable, not a capability, and the FY2026 NDAA sec. 1603's acquisition duty is generic to space warfighting and control.
- Executive Order 14369 - Ensuring American Space Superiority, secs. 2(b)(ii) and 3(d)(i), on cislunar threat detection and the space security strategy
  Primary Executive branch Dec 18, 2025
- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), sec. 1603 - acquisition and operation of space systems for space warfighting and control
  Primary Congress Dec 18, 2025
Jul 4, 2025 Partially done
Section 20009 of the reconciliation act (P.L. 119-21) funded the deep-space surveillance the Quote's purpose clause names: $528,000,000 for the DARC and SILENTBARKER military space situational awareness programs, $1,000,000,000 for the X-37B military spacecraft program, $3,650,000,000 for the development, procurement and integration of United States military satellites and their protection, $150,000,000 for ground moving target indicator satellites and $350,000,000 for military space command and control systems. Section 20003 adds $500,000,000 for national security space launch infrastructure.
- P.L. 119-21 secs. 20003 and 20009 - space situational awareness, military satellite and space launch appropriations
  Primary Congress Jul 4, 2025

Research log

What was searched, and what didn’t count as evidence

Research notes

“Cislunar” spelled as one word is how the enacted and executive texts write it; the Mandate’s hyphenated “cis-lunar” returns nothing, so both spellings were searched.

Partial records money delivered for space domain awareness and a policy naming the cislunar region, against a Quote that asks for the capability to be rapidly expanded. Whether it has been is not published on any allowlisted host.
The EO 14369 §3(d) deliverables could not be found on any allowlisted host (searched 2026-09-03). Executive Order 14369, Ensuring American Space Superiority, signed 2025-12-18, required a space security strategy and a national security space architecture plan by 2026-06-16. www.spaceforce.mil is readable — bare spaceforce.mil does not resolve, which is why an earlier search recorded the site as refusing access — so this negative is now measured rather than assumed. What was read: the service policy-document index at www.spaceforce.mil/space-policy-page/, which lists the DAF Executive Order Implementation set (Objective Force 2040, Future Operating Environment 2040, the Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force and others) and no space security strategy and no national security space architecture plan; and the complete USSF newsroom feed, 500 items spanning 2024-07-30 to 2026-09-01, which carries no article announcing either document — the nearest hits are a Vandenberg installation strategic plan (2026-01-23), DAF data and AI strategies (2026-04-22), a Warfighting Acquisition Strategy (2026-02-26) and a command-alignment story (2026-06-09), none of them the ask’s object. How far the negative reaches: USSF’s own publication channels and policy index. It does not reach OSD, the NSC, or any classified annex. Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners was also sought and not located — it is not announced in the 500-item newsroom sweep, is not on the policy page, and two guessed addresses (one on www.spaceforce.mil and one on media.defense.gov) both returned “not found”.
The 2026 National Defense Strategy, read in full on the same day, carries nothing here either: “space” appears twice, in threat-listing clauses, and “Space Force”, “counterspace” and “orbit” zero times. The strategy that would ordinarily carry a space declaratory policy does not.

Action: expand
Object: U.S. space control capability
ID: 231