4. Department of Defense · Minor
Sustain support for Israel while empowering Gulf partners to defend themselves
Printed page 94 4. Department of Defense
“Sustain support for Israel even as America empowers Gulf partners to take responsibility for their own coastal, air, and missile defenses both individually and working collectively.”
What has happened
- Partially done
All 372 Defense Security Cooperation Agency arms-sales notifications published in the Federal Register since 2025-01-20 were read one at a time at govinfo; 55 name a Gulf purchaser (Saudi Arabia 16, Kuwait 13, the United Arab Emirates 13, Qatar 8, Bahrain 5, Oman 0), against 24 for Israel. The air and missile defense limb is delivered and dated: THAAD with a long-range discrimination radar and Sentinel A4 uplinkers to the United Arab Emirates (Transmittal 26-41, 2026-04-14); 730 PATRIOT PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement missiles to Saudi Arabia as part of "an upgraded integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) system" (26-13, 2026-04-15); up to eight Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars to Kuwait (26-34, 2026-05-07) and a second Kuwaiti LTAMDS case adding the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Integrated Battle Command System as command and control (2026-06-01); 200 PAC-2 GEM-T and 300 PAC-3 MSE missiles to Qatar (2026-06-01); PATRIOT GEM recertification and Post-Deployment Build 8.1 for Kuwait (2026-01-12, 2026-01-13). The item stays `partial` and not `done` on the Quote's own enumeration: "coastal" reaches only one case, Kuwaiti naval-base logistics facilities (24-113, 2026-01-13), and no notification records a Gulf *collective* architecture — the integration sold is each partner's into U.S. systems. §3b, an enumerated list is a limb. This replaces the earlier note that a per-country read of these notices would need a human with a browser.
- DSCA arms sales notification, Transmittal 26-41: United Arab Emirates — Terminal High Altitude Area Defense long-range discrimination radar, Sentinel A4 uplinkers and THAAD fire control
- DSCA arms sales notification, Transmittal 26-13: Saudi Arabia — 730 PATRIOT PAC-3 MSE missiles for an upgraded integrated air and missile defense system
- DSCA arms sales notification: Kuwait — Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense sensor radar with the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Integrated Battle Command System
- DSCA arms sales notification: Qatar — PATRIOT missile replenishment, 200 PAC-2 GEM-T and 300 PAC-3 MSE
- DSCA arms sales notification, Transmittal 24-113: Kuwait — maritime and land facilities at Mohammed Al Ahmed and Ras Al Ard naval bases
- Partially done
The 2026 National Defense Strategy, read in full, states both halves of the ask as departmental policy in a single sentence — and it is still a statement of policy, not delivery. Its Middle East paragraph says "DoW will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, including by strongly backing Israel's efforts to defend itself; deepening cooperation with our Arabian Gulf partners; and enabling integration between Israel and our Arabian Gulf partners, building on President Trump's historic initiative, the Abraham Accords", while "DoW will maintain our ability to take focused, decisive action to defend U.S. interests." That is the sustain limb and the empower limb both named by the Department itself. It does not name coastal, air or missile defense, and under §3b's strategic-plan rule a document that names the object is a statement of intent, so the Gulf limb still turns on instruments outside the strategy. `partial` unchanged.
- Partially done
The FY2026 NDAA extends and modifies the U.S.–Israel cooperative programs (secs. 1231, 1232), the U.S.–Israel research and development authority (sec. 1234), a U.S.–Israel Defense Industrial Base Working Group (sec. 864) and a report on joint exercises (sec. 1235). Support for Israel continues in enacted law — the sustain half of the ask, delivered. The Act carries nothing on Gulf partners assuming their own coastal, air and missile defense, so one object of a two-object ask is delivered and the other is not: `partial` under §3b.
- Partially done
The National Security Strategy states both halves of the ask as policy: America "will always have core interests" in the Gulf, including "that Israel remain secure," and it credits the "successful revitalization of our alliances in the Gulf, with other Arab partners, and with Israel." It also drops the previous approach of "hectoring these nations" and treats Gulf states as partners taking on their own defense and security roles. On the Gulf half that is a strategy document naming the object and no more: under §3b's strategic-plan rule a plan that names the ask is `attempted`, not delivery, and no dated instrument shows Gulf partners taking over their own coastal, air and missile defense.
Research log
What was searched, and what didn’t count as evidence
Research notes
A two-object ask, and the objects level differently. The Israel half is a continuation ask, which reads as done while the thing continues, and it does continue in the FY2026 NDAA’s cooperation authorities. The Gulf half is a positive ask — that Gulf partners be empowered to take responsibility for their own coastal, air and missile defense — which as of 2026-09-06 rests on 55 dated Gulf arms-sales notifications (the fourth event above) rather than, as it did until then, on the National Security Strategy’s description of the relationship. A two-object ask is capped at partial while one object is delivered and the other is not. (Re-leveled from done to partial on review, 2026-09-01.)
This item shares the National Security Strategy with #133 and #136 on the same page, both partial, and the reading now puts all three at the same rung for the same reason: for each of them the Strategy states an intention whose delivery has to be found elsewhere. #135, also on p. 94 and done on the same document, is the exception that shows the test — its Quote asks that burden-sharing occupy a central place in the strategy itself, so the document is that ask’s object rather than evidence about the world.
Added 2026-09-03. The 2026 National Defense Strategy was fetched from media.defense.gov and read in full. The finding that prompted this reading did not flag #137 at all; the strategy’s Middle East paragraph is in fact the most directly on-point in-window Primary statement of this Quote’s two limbs, and it is now the third event above. It does not change the rung: a strategy states intentions and commits to no instrument or date, so it is leveled by what it names, not counted as delivery.
Corrected 2026-09-06. An earlier search recorded that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s arms-sales notifications carry no country in their titles or abstracts, so a per-country reading “would need a human with a browser”. That was wrong about the route, not about the titles. Every one of the 372 Federal Register notices titled “Arms Sales Notification” from 2025-01-22 to 2026-08-21 was retrieved from govinfo.gov, and the purchaser read off the notice’s own “Purchaser:” line. The result is the fourth event above. Distribution, largest first: Israel 24, Australia 18, Poland 17, Saudi Arabia 16, Ukraine 16, Korea 14, Kuwait 13, the United Arab Emirates 13, Taiwan (Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office) 9, Qatar 8, Bahrain 5, Oman 0. The Gulf total is 55. A caution on the count: a plain text search for “Oman” also matches “Romania”, and five Romanian notices were counted as Omani before the purchaser line was read.
This item was also covered by one negative search run across its whole cluster of related asks in this Chapter.
- Action
- other
- Object
- U.S. support for Israel and Gulf partners
- ID
- 137