7. Intelligence Community · Minor
Refocus space-related intelligence collection on threats in space
Printed page 230 7. Intelligence Community
“The IC must therefore refocus and invest in methods that will enable it to characterize accurately the threats that already exist in space, not just on the ground; break down barriers to information sharing and collaboration with the DOD; and embrace commercially derived capabilities that can be adapted to a national security mission.”
What has happened
- Attempted
Executive Order 14369 turns space-related collection toward threats in space. Section 2(b)(ii) makes it policy to ensure "the ability to detect, characterize, and counter threats to United States space interests from very low-Earth orbit and through cislunar space, including any placement of nuclear weapons in space"; section 3(d)(i) requires an implemented space security strategy that addresses current and projected threats through cislunar space and incorporates a technology plan for detecting, characterizing and countering adversary nuclear weapons in space, with the DNI named as a coordinating party; and section 2(b)(iii) commits to integrating commercial space capabilities, the third limb of the Quote. Directives with deadlines that fall after the research date and no published strategy, so `attempted`.
Research log
What was searched, and what didn’t count as evidence
Research notes
- Executive Order 14369 carries the whole group of space asks on p. 230 (#611, #612, #613). Its operative words were read at the Federal Register text on govinfo.gov.
- All three are attempted: the order sets policy and 90- to 180-day tasking deadlines that fall after the research date, and no implementing document (the space security strategy, the national security space architecture plan, or the ally-and-partner plan) has been published.
- Action
- other
- Object
- Space threat intelligence collection posture
- ID
- 613